Interplay between low-carbon energy transitions and national security: An analysis of policy integration and coherence in Estonia, Finland and Scotland by Kivimaa, Paula & Sivonen, Marja H.
Energy Research & Social Science 75 (2021) 102024
Available online 18 March 2021
2214-6296/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Interplay between low-carbon energy transitions and national security: An 
analysis of policy integration and coherence in Estonia, Finland 
and Scotland 
Paula Kivimaa a,b,*, Marja H. Sivonen a,c 
a Finnish Environment Institute SYKE, Climate Change Programme, Latokartanonkaari 11, 00790 Helsinki, Finland 
b University of Sussex, Science Policy Research Unit, Jubilee Building, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RH, United Kingdom 
c University of Tampere, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kalevantie 4, 33100 Tampere, Finland   







A B S T R A C T   
Sustainable Development Goals aim for a better future, but gains are threatened by conflict and governance 
failures, exacerbated by climate change. While research on energy security is well-established, conceptual- 
analytical research on sustainability transitions has paid little attention to security threats as factors influencing 
transitions or security policy as part of policy mixes. This paper combines policy coherence and integration 
analysis of energy and security strategy documents with sustainability transitions’ research, considering how 
landscape pressures and energy niches are presented in documents pertaining to Estonia, Finland and Scotland 
during 2006–2020. The findings show that security and energy policies present a functional overlap. Yet, policy 
integration and coherence are insufficiently addressed, conflicts created by coexisting low-carbon and 
hydrocarbon-based security considerations. An increasingly multifaceted landscape creates a complicated policy 
environment where pursuing policy coherence becomes harder. Despite the accelerating energy transition, the 
security implications of energy niches have received too little attention.   
1. Introduction 
When opening the annual General Assembly of the United Nations in 
2016, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that, while the Sustainable 
Development Goals offer a manifesto for a better future, gains are 
threatened by conflict and failures of governance [1]. This is a particular 
challenge for sustainable energy transitions due to the significant 
geopolitical and economic importance of energy [2], and the emergence 
of “a new era in which energy security and climate change mitigation 
are both fundamental objectives”, requiring more complex forms of 
policy coordination [3]. While the energy sector has been the key focus 
of academic research on sustainability transitions [4,5], this literature 
has paid scant attention to security threats as factors influencing tran-
sitions. The environmental sustainability debate often ignores security 
questions, although the attempts to accelerate sustainability transitions 
are likely to face barriers from manifestations of national security. 
Research on policy mixes in transitions [6] has not addressed security or 
defence policies. To address this research gap, we pay attention to na-
tional security and defence policy in connection to low-carbon energy 
transitions from the perspective of policy coherence and integration. 
In this article, we analyse whether sufficient policy coherence and 
integration exists between security and defence policies and low-carbon 
energy policies. Coherence is important to overall policymaking to 
reduce and manage cross-domain policy conflicts and make the use of 
public funds more efficient. Such conflicts may, for example, hinder or 
reduce the effects of climate policies and, thus, stagnate the energy 
transition in practice. Policy coherence is of interest in different policy 
settings. For example, the UN Sustainable Development Goal 17 ‘means 
of implementation’ includes a specific target to ‘enhance policy coher-
ence for sustainable development’ and the European Union (EU) has 
pursued coherent policy making regarding security [7], development 
[8], and environment [9]. 
In the security context, however, pursuits towards policy coherence 
and integration also contain an inherent risk – a securitisation of low- 
carbon energy transitions. Securitisation is defined as a process where 
an “issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency 
measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure” [10]. It can be rhetorically powerful to draw attention to 
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issues, such as the environment, that may otherwise be left unprotected, 
but the use of the concept of security has consequences on governing 
that are important to notice [11]. 
No single definition of security exists; the concept has evolved over 
time. In its simplest, security has been described as “the absence of 
threats to acquired values” [12]. It is a derivative concept, meaning that 
different worldviews create dissimilar conceptions of security [11] and, 
thus, a diversity of meaning. Military security, the once dominating 
conceptualisation of national security [11], is defined as the ability of 
governments to maintain themselves against internal and external mil-
itary threats and the use of military power [10]. However, national se-
curity is an increasingly broad concept that includes the protection of 
state and other actors with extensions to environmental, health and 
technology related threats [11]. This has given rise to further con-
ceptualisations of economic, political, environmental and human secu-
rity [10,11]. Our empirical analysis is open to multiple 
conceptualisations of security that emerge from the data. 
Perceptions of security are often connected to geopolitics, which is a 
similarly nuanced concept. Classical geopolitics regards it as the influ-
ence of geographical factors (e.g. a country’s size, position or resources) 
on international relations and the power of states [13,14]. However, 
critical geopolitics questions the pregiven role of geographical factors in 
international relations and wishes to expose how geographical as-
sumptions are used in world politics [15], problematising existing 
structures of power and knowledge [16]. What is interesting from the 
perspective of energy policy is that geopolitical assumptions may play 
both explicit and hidden roles in policy decisions [14,17], even in 
countries that have adopted more market-based approaches to energy 
policy [18]. 
The geopolitical approach is often connected to pursuits towards 
energy security [19]. Energy security means low vulnerability of vital 
energy systems [20] referring to the absence of threats to system oper-
ations and the capabilities of states to respond to these threats [21]. This 
means, for example, the security of supply of the needed fuels, minerals 
and technical components (often dependent on international markets 
and trade), security of production (against technical faults or environ-
mental disruptions), diversification of sources, harnessing of domestic 
energy, and stockpiles [22]. However, there is variety in how both ac-
ademic literature and the EU member states express energy security, 
creating a fragmented policy setting and contextualised discussions of its 
different dimensions [23,24]. In short, energy security is a context- 
specific political phenomenon [25,26]. Given energy security has 
become a standard sub-topic of both energy and security policy, our 
analysis focuses on how policy goes beyond this by referring to such 
issues as national security, defence or cyber security in connection to 
energy. 
We examine the interplay between national security and (low-car-
bon) energy policies by conducting a differentiating comparative anal-
ysis [27] of policy documents pertaining to three small European nations 
– Estonia (ES), Finland (FI) and Scotland (SC) - in how policy integration 
and coherence demonstrate in energy and security policies since 2006. 
Public policy is of interest due to its influence on the acceleration or 
deceleration of sustainability transitions [28]. Policy strategy docu-
ments present formalised policy goals and instrument mixes that have 
been recognised by the political parties in power. The nations share a 
small population number and an EU member state status (during the 
analytical period) but were purposefully selected to present differing 
energy resource profiles (ES 72% of energy from domestically produced 
oil shale; FI domestic bioenergy, nuclear and imported fossil fuels; SC a 
significant share of electricity from wind energy but fossil fuels in heat 
and transport), relationship to Russia, and governance status (FI inde-
pendent since 1917, ES independent since 1991, and SC a nation within 
the United Kingdom with a devolved government). We regard the 
relationship to Russia important, because the Russian government has 
used its energy resources as a political instrument towards Europe since 
the late-1990s through price hikes and supply cut-offs [29,30]. It is also 
a major energy exporter and strategic trading partner for the EU [31]. 
Industrial production is most important for Estonia, circa 29% of GDP, 
but has been shifting to service and commercial sectors [32]; followed 
by Finland, 24% of GDP, which has a large energy-intensive industry 
contributing to high carbon-intensity [33]; and Scotland, 18% of GDP, 
with the least energy-intensive industry. 
Building on this background, the organisation of the article is the 
following. Section 2 briefly reviews literature on security in sustain-
ability transitions concerning energy. Section 3 introduces the concepts 
policy coherence and integration, followed by the analytical framework 
and methods in Section 4. Section 5 presents the findings regarding 
policy integration, policy coherence, and landscape and niche elements 
in energy and security policy documents. Section 6 discusses and 
concludes. 
2. Security in sustainability transitions 
Security and securitisation of fossil fuels has been studied extensively 
[e.g. [2,29,34]]. Increasing attention has also been paid to security in 
the context of transitions towards renewable energy -based systems and 
phasing out fossil fuels. This research points out the changing security 
aspects of energy demand and supply, such as new products and routes 
for trade [35] and yet unknown scale and scope of security challenges 
for critical metal and mineral supply [36]. Research appears divided on 
the opportunities for peace and consensus building versus risk of conflict 
via renewable energy [17], its effects on land use [37], and climate 
mitigation more broadly [38]. Many studies show how right-wing 
populism and hostility towards climate and renewable energy policy 
are connected with risk of conflicts [39,40]. The possibility of global 
unrest due to conflicts caused by climate change has been widely 
addressed [41–43]. Some point towards the reduced political and eco-
nomic leverage of oil producing states [44]. Recent studies also argue 
that the risk of geopolitical conflict over critical materials for renewable 
energy is limited, while the cyber security implications are unclear [14]. 
Moreover, while the low-carbon energy transition is likely to improve 
climate security [38] globally, petroleum production in certain states is 
likely to continue [14,45]. Many security implications of energy tran-
sitions continue to unfold. 
Despite the expansion of the above literature, the concept of security 
has not played a significant role in the specific field of sustainability 
transitions research that addresses the transformation of socio-technical 
systems towards environmental sustainability based on particular 
conceptual-analytical frameworks [5]. One of the most used frameworks 
in sustainability transitions studies is the multi-level perspective (MLP) 
[e.g. [46,47]]. It portrays change in socio-technical systems around 
societal service provision (e.g. energy, food, mobility) as alignments of 
processes within and between three analytical levels. Niches are pro-
tected spaces, such as specific markets or application domains, where 
potentially disruptive niche innovations develop via processes of 
learning and social networking but are safeguarded from the selection 
pressures of the dominating regime [46,48]. Socio-technical regimes are 
the deep structure of socio-technical systems involving alignment of 
technologies, infrastructures, markets, public policies, practices and 
behavioural patterns [47]. They may be destabilised and de-aligned via 
landscape-level influences, creating windows of opportunity for niches 
to mainstream [46]. The landscape characterises long-term gradual de-
velopments, such as climate change and demographic trends, and rapid 
abrupt events, such as natural disasters and wars that create pressures 
for regimes to change [49]. For example, Russian politics can be 
regarded as a significant landscape pressure influencing low-carbon 
energy transitions with possible implications on the interplay of en-
ergy and defence policy regimes in smaller European countries. Here, 
the MLP serves as a broad basis for examining how energy niches or 
landscape factors show in connection to security. 
Johnstone and colleagues were the first to pay explicit attention to 
security in sustainability transitions [50,51]. They argued that the 
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military establishment is missing from the theorisation of transitions and 
describe militaries as means by which states occasionally pursue their 
energy-focused foreign policies [51]. Johnstone et al. associated terms 
such as the ‘military-industrial complex’ and the ‘national security state’ 
to the concept of deep incumbency [50]. This means that incumbent 
actors who have vested interests in the established socio-technical 
regime may try to impede niche innovations via different strategies. 
Two strategies are linked to the question of security: securitisation, 
recasting policy goals in terms of national security, and masking, for 
example, incorporating nuclear submarine construction costs into civil 
nuclear programmes. 
Other sustainability transition studies have addressed security only 
in passing. In discussing pathways for transitions in the electricity 
sector, Verbong and Geels [52] made a reference to geopolitical security 
and energy security as major landscape threats. Similarly, Geels [53] has 
considered the military dimension being a part of fossil fuel alliances of 
policymakers and incumbent firms. Most recent research has acknowl-
edged the military and geopolitical considerations as the context for the 
technological innovation system of large commercial nuclear reactors 
[54]. Here, we bring national security to sustainability transitions 
studies, by examining its connections via policymaking to low-carbon 
energy transitions. 
3. Coherence and integration as concepts of policy interplay 
3.1. Policy coherence 
The concept ‘policy coherence’ originates from European foreign and 
security policy [55] and development policy [56]. In the foreign policy 
context, policy coherence has been described as common framework 
policies for the EU, free of contradictions and reduced distinctions be-
tween foreign and domestic policies of member states [55,57,58], while 
this aim has not realised in practice. This stream of literature does not 
provide a more generic framework for policy coherence. In the devel-
opment policy context, Carbone [56] has identified different forms of 
policy coherence: (1) horizontal coherence between policy sub-systems, 
(2) vertical coherence between the EU and member states, (3) internal 
coherence, i.e. consistency of objectives within a policy sub-system, and 
(4) multilateral coherence, i.e. interaction between international 
organisations. 
Climate and environmental policy studies have addressed policy 
coherence and integration extensively. We follow the definition of pol-
icy coherence presented in this literature “as an attribute of policy that 
systematically reduces conflicts and promotes synergies between and 
within different policy areas to achieve the outcomes associated with 
jointly agreed policy objectives” [59], where, the policy outputs of 
different policy sub-systems should be harmonious, without giving pri-
ority to a specific objective [60]. However, there is no agreement on the 
exact meaning of the term, and the literature includes an excess of 
definitions [61]. For example, Rogge and Reichardt [62] have used 
coherence to refer to the quality of policy processes [also [63]]. 
We focus on horizontal coherence of policy processes and outputs (i. 
e. objectives and instruments) between two policy sub-systems. The 
process dimension denotes mechanisms designed to advance coherence 
[56], such as political leadership, parliamentary committees or execu-
tive agencies [64], or shared visions between policy sub-systems, 
implemented by statements and actions [65]. The policy outputs 
dimension may include comprehensive frameworks combining the ob-
jectives of different policy sub-systems [7], and recognised synergies or 
absences of contradictions between policy objectives, design, in-
struments and implementation arrangements [57,59,66]. 
Often the realisation of policy coherence is far from ideal. Divergent 
ideals, interests, and perceptions in different policy sub-systems [56] 
complicate the achievement of collective action from policymakers [7]. 
Furthermore, policy mutates when it is reinterpreted by public officials 
who implement it to practice [67]. Conflicts unseen or concealed at the 
higher level of policy formulation are detected when different policies 
are implemented [59]. This also links to the issue of coherence for 
whom; whose perspective is taken influences whether policies are seen 
to cohere [56]. 
3.2. Policy integration 
Policy integration is an attribute of policy that can advance policy 
coherence. The difference between the terms is that ‘policy integration’, 
i.e. the integration of a specific policy objective into another policy sub- 
system, such as the integration of national security objectives into en-
ergy policy, can occur independently of horizontal coherence and aim 
for principled priority. 
The concept emerged in the 1990s within European environmental 
policy, following the 1987 Brundtland report. Environmental policy 
integration (EPI) received much interest in academic literature in the 
early 2000s [68–70], containing different perceptions of policy inte-
gration. Russel et al. [71] have categorised these as normative ap-
proaches that emphasise the principled priority of environmental issues 
and the need of political commitment [e.g. [69]]; organisational and 
procedural approaches such as departmental responsibilities, adminis-
trative integration of instruments and mandates [e.g. [9]]; output-based 
assessments of integration, whether policy outputs and outcomes 
generate environmental improvements [72], and reframing approaches, 
focused on learning between policy actors [e.g. [68]]. Kivimaa and 
Mickwitz [72] evaluated EPI in a policy sub-system based on whether 
environmental objectives are included, their consistency with other 
objectives, their emphasis, and specifications to evaluate and report on 
EPI. Runhaar et al. [73] argue that a distinction can be made between 
weak EPI in the form of procedural input and strong EPI mirrored in 
policy outputs. 
Recent work on policy (dis)integration analyses political processes 
behind policy (dis)integration and coherence [66]. It examines the 
extent to which a cross-cutting policy problem is recognised to require 
holistic governance; actors and institutions involved and density of in-
teractions between sub-systems; the range of policies and subsequent 
coherence; and the extent to which policies contain instruments to 
address the problem, and the coherence of the instrument mix [66,74]. 
Policy integration faces challenges as environmental policy objec-
tives have failed to fully integrate into other policy subsystems [73]. 
First, policy integration may improve policy coherence, but it can also 
remain an isolated functional exercise without generating interaction 
between actors across policy sub-systems. Second, policy integration has 
a fluctuating quality. It can first increase but then decrease again [74]. 
This may result, for example, from conflicting interests or lack of access 
to knowledge and advice [73]. Third, cultural and cognitive frames 
behind policymaking affect the degree to which policy integration oc-
curs [75]. Lack of sufficient integration can show in policy documents as 
conflicting statements and the absence of discussion on potentially 
conflicting objectives [73]. 
Policy integration has been noted as a specific challenge for energy 
policy that faces two fundamental objectives, climate change mitigation 
and energy security, while energy efficiency that would benefit both has 
shown poor progress [3]. Lack of policy coordination creates higher 
costs for obtaining both policy objectives, resulting in sub-optimal so-
lutions, calling for a two-way integration process to maximise synergies 
[76]. 
4. Research approach and method 
In this article, we conducted comparative case study research by 
means of policy document analysis concerning three countries during 
2006–2020. We were interested in policy strategy documents, because 
they produce tangible outputs, such as context-setting, objectives, and 
proposed policy instrument packages, as well as contain promises from 
policymakers to stakeholders, influencing what stakeholders expect 
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from future policy development and their choices of action. Policy 
documents include a certain interpretation of context and statements 
that have been designed to speak to different audiences. 
The countries analysed - Estonia, Finland and Scotland – have pop-
ulations of less than 6 million, giving a small-country perspective and, 
thus, complementing previous studies on energy and security focused on 
large countries [e.g. [77,78]]. The selection aimed at variety in terms of 
country profiles regarding domestic fossil energy reserves, renewable 
energy production, role in the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO), and relationship to Russia as a major energy power 
(Table 1). The countries’ takes on fossil fuel phase out, import de-
pendency and geopolitical positioning differ. 
Key energy/climate and security/defence strategy documents (see 
Appendix A) were identified for each country, by searching the websites 
of the Parliaments and the Scottish Government, Prime Minister’s Of-
fices, Ministries for Defence, Foreign Affairs, Energy, and Economic 
Affairs; contacting personnel; conducting background reading on the 
case countries; and by references made in other strategy documents. 
Typically, defence policy is a narrower sub-system than a more cross-
cutting security policy; we focused on both. In addition, we examined 
climate policy to the extent it related to energy policy. We wanted to 
focus on the official policy agenda presented via strategy documents of 
relevant ministries and the government. We, thus, excluded reports and 
assessments produced by consultants or working groups. The large 
number of documents also required some boundaries to be drawn. 
Broader national strategies, programmes and visions were excluded. 
While they may give some insights on policy coherence, they would not 
give information on policy integration in energy and security policy sub- 
systems. We used English versions whenever available; otherwise, the 
original ones. We analysed in total 72 documents: 18 for Estonia, 21 for 
Finland, and 33 for Scotland (Table 2). The materials were divided into 
three periods (2006–2010, 2011–2015, 2016–2020) to compare devel-
opment over time. Our starting point was the year 2006, when energy 
security reached the top of the EU’s political agenda following the first 
Russian-Ukrainian natural gas dispute [79]. The second period presents 
time after the EU Energy 2020 Strategy for competitive, secure and 
sustainable energy in November 2010 [80] and the third period after the 
EU Energy Union Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with 
a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy in February 2015 [81] and 
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. 
The security/defence strategy documents were searched for occur-
rences of energy-related words: “energy”, “electric*”, “heat”, “nuclear 
power”, “fuel”, “oil”, “gas”, “peat”, “renewable”, “wind” and “solar”. 
The paragraphs in which at least one of these words were used were 
inserted into Excel, to its own row for coding. The energy/climate 
strategy documents were searched for the occurrences of words 
“security”, “defence/defense”, “geopolitic*” and “threat”. The word 
“risk” was omitted from the analysis as it is used in many different 
contexts as a general word. For Scotland, paragraphs from the broader 
UK strategies were excluded if they only concerned England and Wales. 
We searched for the selected words, and coded text paragraphs around 
them. We also conducted broader reading of the documents to note if 
relevant parts were missing with some paragraphs added. 
In the analysis, we combined a focus on policy integration and 
coherence with the MLP (Fig. 1). First, we analysed the degree to which 
security policy has been integrated into energy policy, and energy policy 
has been integrated into security and defence policy (Step 1), and the 
existence of mechanisms improving coherence as framings presented in 
the documents (Step 2). These framings may concern the description of 
the issue in general, or outline specific objectives and measures, or re-
sources concerning that issue. For example, we examined whether 
broader mechanisms are introduced for reducing conflicts and 
improving synergies between the policy sub-systems, such as over-
arching visions, committees or agencies, and whether the documents 
show synergies or conflicts between the policy areas. Second, applying 
the MLP, we made an assessment whether and how the coded para-
graphs focused on the energy or security regime, energy niches, and/or 
broader landscape factors (Steps 3 and 4). 
The selected paragraphs were analysed by two researchers in Excel, 
following Meyer and Avery [82], using codes for the MLP-level, policy 
coherence and policy integration. The codes had 3–8 sub-codes each 
identified based on the literature review on the concepts (Table 3). We 
aimed for intercoder reliability, i.e. that “a single knowledgeable coder 
may be reasonably confident that his or her coding would be repro-
ducible by other equally knowledgeable coders” [83]. While we exam-
ined the frequency of mentions of different issues, our analysis was 
principally oriented to what was described and how. As energy security 
is increasingly a standard sub-topic of energy and security policies, our 
analysis specifically focused on how the documents refer to national 
security, defence or cyber security. For example, we assessed the inte-
gration of security policy to be ‘low’ when energy policy documents did 
not go beyond typical energy security remarks. 
5. Findings 
5.1. Introduction to energy and security policy in the case countries 
Estonian energy policy is based on energy independence from Russia, 
Table 1 
Case country population, energy profiles and geopolitical positions.  
Country Population Energy profile (2018) Connections to NATO, EU 
and Russia 
Estonia 1.3 million Oil shale important; 
30% of total energy 
from RES 
Former part of Soviet Union 
(independence in 1991). 
NATO member and EU 
member since 2004. 
Finland 5.5 million No domestic oil/gas 
reserves; 41% RES. 
Diverse energy mix. 
Neighbouring country to 
Russia, independence from 
Russian Empire in 1917. EU 




5.5 million Significant oil 
reserves; 21% of 
energy from RES, 77% 
for electricity from 
RES 
Partially autonomous 
region and constituent 
nation of the United 
Kingdom. In NATO since 
1952, EU since 1973. Links 
to Russia as a net energy 
importer. 
Sources: Eurostat [83], Scottish Energy Statistics Hub [84] 
Table 2 
Analysed policy document material.  
Period/sub- 
system 




4 documents, 243 
pages, 75 coded 
paragraphs 
2 documents, 314 
pages, 22 coded 
paragraphs 
6 documents; 917 





3 documents, 68 
pages, 17 coded 
paragraphs 
3 documents, 313 
pages, 104 coded 
paragraphs 
3 documents, 219 





1 document, 75 
pages, 11 coded 
paragraphs 
3 documents, 320 
pages, 33 coded 
paragraphs 
5 documents, 477 





3 documents, 54 
pages, 2 coded 
paragraphs 
4 documents, 263 
pages, 78coded 
paragraphs 
7 documents, 372 





3 documents, 325 
pages, 118 coded 
paragraphs 
3 documents, 472 
pages, 67 coded 
paragraphs 
6 documents, 346 





4 documents, 145 
pages, 13 coded 
paragraphs 
6 documents, 241 
pages, 51 coded 
paragraphs 
6 documents, 290 
pages, 15 coded 
paragraphs 
Total 18 documents, 
910 pages, 236 
coded paragraphs 
21 documents, 
1923 pages, 355 
coded paragraphs 
33 documents, 
2621 pages, 557 
coded paragraphs  
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the country having the lowest import dependence in the EU. Security of 
supply, competitive energy prices and the oil shale industry play an 
important role [84], causing Estonia’s ecological footprint to be among 
the highest in Europe [85]. However, the energy transition is changing 
Estonia’s traditional stance on energy. Estonia is part of the NordPool, 
the Nordic power market, with gas connection plans to North and South 
via the Balticconnector. Estonia’s security policy is based on a broad 
security concept, referring to the state’s capability to defend its values 
and objectives from military and non-military risks. Security policy aims 
to guarantee independence, sovereignty, survival and the constitutional 
order [86]. Cyber security is of specific interest as Estonia is among the 
most digitalised societies, Tallinn hosting the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence [87]. 
Finland’s energy policy has for long been based on security of supply 
via multiple energy sources, domestic production based on bioenergy 
and peat, and the needs of the energy intensive industry. Some biofuels 
are imported [88], record amount in 2019 from Russia and the Baltic 
states [89]. Energy policy is characterised by dependence on imports of 
oil, gas and electricity from Russia [90] and operation in the NordPool. 
Climate change concerns became to the policy agenda in the 1990s [91], 
yet phasing out peat has been politically difficult. Defence and security 
policy are focused on the operation of the Defence Forces and a 
comprehensive concept of security to maintain independence and ter-
ritorial sovereignty and promote the population’s wellbeing. “The pri-
mary aim of Finland’s foreign and security policy is to avoid becoming a 
party to a military conflict” [92]. The threat posed by its neighbouring 
country Russia has played a role in defence policy planning, tradition-
ally being too sensitive to openly discuss [93] but becoming more open 
since the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 [94]. 
Energy policy in Scotland, and the UK, is based on a long-history of 
domestic fossil fuels, while renewable energy and nuclear power are 
seen as increasingly important due to diminishing domestic 
hydrocarbon production (coal production ended in 2005) [95]. A low- 
carbon transition has been pursued since early 2000s, with the 
Climate Change Act 2008 as an important cross-sectoral policy. For 
Scotland, the responsibility for security and energy policy lies with the 
UK government. Scotland’s devolved administration has duties related 
to climate change mitigation, economic development and energy effi-
ciency [95], with more ambitious plans than the UK. Scotland is part of 
interconnected power networks with France, Ireland and the 
Netherlands with plans to connect with Norway and Denmark [96]. 
Despite efforts by the Scottish government to be more involved in se-
curity, Scotland still depends on the UK government agencies, for 
instance, regarding cyber security, even with its notable IT-sector [97]. 
Yet, the Scottish Government has its distinctive way of doing things in 
certain aspects of security governance, including policing and resilience 
planning [97]. UK defence policy aims to protect its people and pros-
pects, to prevent conflicts and to prepare for possible battle [98]. 
Fig. 2 shows an overview of selected events providing context to our 
analysis. 
5.2. Integration of energy and decarbonisation into security and defence 
policies 
This section summarises our analysis of how energy policy has been 
integrated into the case countries’ national security and defence pol-
icies. The analysis focused on examining the appearance in texts of (1) 
procedural and learning processes for integrating energy into security 
policy; (2) evidence of integrating energy into security policy objectives 
and (3) measures, and; (4) principled priority of energy. 
Across the countries, energy issues were not very visible in defence 
policy. Energy policy appears, however, functionally integrated with 
security policy via the concepts of ‘energy security’ and ‘critical infra-
structure’ and the use of a comprehensive concept of national security. 
Fig. 1. Analytical focus on policy integration and coherence in the context of the multi-level perspective, and research steps taken.  
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Albeit not reaching to the kind of functional overlap, where policy in-
struments perform overlapping functions [99], the concepts and asso-
ciated measures show energy security in the strategy-level of both policy 
sub-systems. Yet, the degree to which this integration shows, and the 
issues raised in the documents vary between the countries and periods 
(Table 4). 
Energy issues are acknowledged in Estonian security policy but with 
a low degree of integration compared to Finland and Scotland. During 
2006–2010, in Estonia, energy security (security of supply and infra-
structure) as a policy objective was intertwined with aims to deepen 
cooperation with the EU, the Baltic states and the US. The energy se-
curity objective contained the ‘rational’ use of oil shale and introduction 
of renewable energy technologies, creating a conflict between decar-
bonisation and the continuation of fossil fuel production. The only 
measure relating to energy policy was the early warning system for nu-
clear radiation. During 2011–2015, energy was addressed much less, in 
only two paragraphs. During 2015–2020, energy policy integration was 
similarly low as during the first period. The extensions to objectives 
included energy efficiency, peat, and reducing natural gas use. 
Finland’s security/defence policy documents have more extensively 
integrated energy than those in Estonia, showing in the amount and 
nature of content. During 2006–2010, energy policy integration was 
visible as objectives for energy security and to mitigate climate change 
and avoid one-sided energy dependencies internationally. The policy 
documents referred to the Energy and Climate Strategy. Evidence of 
energy policy integration in measures show as stockpiling hydrocarbons, 
developing renewable energy, arrangements for Nordic collaboration, 
and nuclear safety. Energy efficiency of repairs in defence policy is 
mentioned. During 2011–2015, energy policy integration deepened, 
showing not only as evidence in objectives and measures, but also as 
selected procedures to improve integration. The Defence Administra-
tion’s Strategy on Society and Environment stated that the defence 
forces will draft a climate and energy programme. Improving energy 
efficiency of the Defence Forces’ infrastructure was coupled with user 
practices, education, monitoring and reporting. Policy integration was 
visible in defence policy, where the documents state a vision considering 
environmental policy for defence capability and meeting the govern-
ment’s climate and energy policy requirements in developing defence 
infrastructure, including guidance for energy efficiency in military 
areas. Energy considerations highlighted different objectives and mea-
sures than before, including collaboration with Norway, Russia and 
China in energy expertise and preparing for cross-border threats in 
Table 3 
The main codes and sub-codes used in the analysis.  
Main code Sub-codes 
MLP in context  1. Niche  
2. Regime  
3. Landscape [46] 
Policy integration – integration of 
energy into security/defence 
policy  
1. Procedural and learning processes for 
integrating energy into security/defence 
policy (e.g. plans, programmes, task forces, 
reporting requirements) [9]  
2. Evidence of integrating energy into 
security/defence objectives [72]  
3. Evidence of integrating energy into 
security/defence policy measures/ 
instruments [72]  
4. Principled priority of (low-carbon) energy 
in security/defence policy [69] 
Policy integration – integration of 
security into energy policy  
1. Procedural and learning processes for 
integrating security into energy policy (e.g. 
plans, programmes, task forces, reporting 
requirements) [9]  
2. Evidence of integrating security into 
energy/climate objectives [72]  
3. Evidence of integrating security/defence 
into energy policy measures/instruments 
[72]  
4. Principled priority of security in energy 
policy [69] 
Policy coherence  1. Coherent vision for decarbonised energy 
and security/defence [65]  
2. Overarching framework/strategy for 
energy and security/defence [7]  
3. Coherence of objectives between energy 
and security/defence [59]  
4. Joint instruments for energy and security/ 
defence [64]  
5. Coherence of instruments between energy 
and security/defence [59]  
6. Mechanisms/processes to improve 
coherence between energy security/ 
defence [64]  
7. High level support for coherence [64]  
8. Synergy or conflict [59]  
Fig. 2. Selected major events and developments related to energy dur-
ing 2006–2020. 
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climate and energy policy. During 2016–2020, energy policy integration 
was no longer explicit in procedures. Yet, new issues were raised as 
evidence of integration in objectives, including a need to coordinate se-
curity and energy policy, and intensifying energy and security cooper-
ation with the US, EU, Russia and China. Carbon-neutral transition and 
climate resilience were mentioned. Energy policy integration showed 
Table 4 
Summary of energy policy integration in security and defence policy documents.   
Estonia Finland Scotland 
2006–2010 Evidence in 
objectives 
Low integration in 












integration in terms 
of energy security, 
references to 
National Energy and 
Climate Strategy, and 
climate change  
Evidence in 
objectives 
High integration in 




National Climate and 
Energy Strategy, 
climate change, 
open global energy 
markets, security 
and stability in 
international 
relations 
Evidence of EPI in 
measures 
Low integration; a 
warning system for 
nuclear radiation 
mentioned  
Evidence of EPI in 
measures 
Moderate 











and measures for 
nuclear safety 
Evidence of EPI in 
measures 
High-to-moderate 
integration in terms 





for climate change, 
security 
enhancements at 






























Evidence of EPI in 
objectives 
High-to-moderate 
integration in terms 








climate and energy 
policy decisions, 
energy efficient 
military areas, Arctic 










Evidence of EPI in 
objectives 
Moderate 
integration in terms 




flooding, security of 
maritime energy 
trade and offshore 
energy installations, 
managing risks 
posed by regional 
instability, climate 
change, natural 
events and rising 
global energy 
demand 
Evidence of EPI in 
measures 
No observations 
Evidence of EPI in 
measures 
Moderate 
integration in terms 
of guidance for 
energy efficiency in 
military areas and 
defence force 
premises, 
Evidence of EPI in 
measures 
High integration in 
terms of assessing 
security implications 
of offshore energy 
and national energy 
infrastructure, Royal 
Navy maintains  
Table 4 (continued )  
Estonia Finland Scotland 
international 
cooperation to 
prepare for cross- 
border threats in 
climate and energy 
policy  




















integration in terms 
of climate and 
energy programme 
for defence forces, 
and education and 
monitoring to 
improve energy 






Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate 
Change a permanent 
member of National 
Security Council   
Principled 








2016–2020 Evidence of EPI in 
objectives 
Low integration in 






Evidence of EPI in 
objectives 
High integration in 
terms of energy 
security, security 
policy stability in the 
Arctic, coordinating 








Evidence of EPI in 
objectives 
Low integration in 
terms of energy 
security and critical 
infrastructure, 
mitigation of threats 
from climate and 
energy policy  
Evidence of EPI in 
measures 
Low integration, a 
warning system for 
nuclear radiation 
mentioned 
Evidence of EPI in 
measures 
Low-to-moderate 
integration in terms 








energy and security 
Evidence of EPI in 
measures 
Moderate 
integration in terms 
of 
legislation for 
security of oil and 
gas exploration and 
production, energy 
task force for 
nationwide power 
failure, finance for 
clean energy 
infrastructure in 























No observations  
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widening content but less depth. 
Energy policy integration in documents concerning Scotland showed 
as a larger number of objectives during 2006–2010 and of measures 
during all periods compared to Estonia and Finland. Securing global 
energy supply was addressed, an aspect missing from other countries’ 
documents, possibly explained by Britain’s colonial past. Britain’s early 
leadership in climate change is evidenced as frequent mentions of the 
low-carbon transition and connections between climate change and in-
ternational stability during 2006–2010. Same as in Finland, the policy 
documents referred to national climate and energy strategy. Akin to 
Estonia, there were conflicting objectives and measures between inte-
grating traditional energy policy versus low-carbon energy policy. 
During 2011–2015, less evidence exists of integration in objectives, while 
new issues included the security of maritime energy trade and offshore 
installations. A new measure was finance for developing countries to 
increase energy access. The National Security Council included the 
Secretary of State for Climate and Energy, i.e. a procedure for integra-
tion. During 2016–2020, energy policy integration weakened, contain-
ing earlier objectives to protect infrastructure and work internationally to 
ensure energy security. Measures included improving cyber security 
advice and skills in the energy sector. 
None of the countries stated a principal priority for energy over se-
curity. Yet, clearly, energy policy is functionally integrated into national 
security. Explicit mentions of procedures of integration are rare, 
appearing only during 2011–2015. Selected examples contain energy- 
policy representation in national security committees, a climate and 
energy programme for defence forces, and monitoring and reporting on 
energy efficiency implementation. The analysis also shows conflicts 
between fossil fuels and low-carbon transition objectives, international 
cooperation as a popular strategy for energy security, and global climate 
security aspects being partially visible. Fig. 3 is our interpretation of how 
the policy documents show evidence of energy policy integration using 
the four analytical categories ranging from low (dotted line) to high 
(thick line) integration. It differentiates between traditional energy 
policy connected to fossil fuels, and new, low-carbon energy policy 
linked to climate change concerns and renewable energy. While the 
second period has a somewhat stronger emphasis of the latter, both co- 
exist in all periods. 
5.3. Integration of security policy into energy policy documents 
Here, we summarise our analysis of security policy integration into 
energy policy. The analysis focused on examining the appearance of (1) 
procedural and learning processes for integrating security into energy 
policy; (2) evidence of integrating security into energy policy objectives 
and (3) measures, and; (4) principled priority of security (Table 5). We 
view integration of security “low” when the documents do not go 
beyond energy security. Across countries, references were made to 
broader security, such as cyber security and including defence in plan-
ning energy policy. These connections were least frequent during 
2010–2015 but increasing in 2016–2020, especially in Estonia. 
During 2006–2010 in Estonian documents, security was moderately 
visible in objectives as references to energy security and the Security 
Strategy. The measures implied moderate integration, for example, en-
ergy market cooperation and diversification of energy supply to reduce 
dependence from Russia and considering the security of offshore wind 
planning. During 2011–2015, integration was low. During 2016–2020, 
security policy integration increased significantly. More security-related 
objects were mentioned, such as the National Security Concept and na-
tional defence considerations in energy policy. Measures included in-
vestments into additional pre-warning systems for defence to enable 
offshore wind development, Baltic interconnector and energy synchro-
nisation projects, and Cyber Security Strategy. Processes for integration 
included the Ministers of Defence and of Foreign affairs as members in 
the Government Climate and Energy Committee, and “readiness of war” 
as an important principle for energy systems development. The princi-
pled priority of national security was not explicitly stated but becomes 
obvious through the integration of objectives and measures and pro-
cesses for integration. 
Finland’s documents show a similar level of security policy inte-
gration as in Estonia and Scotland, apart from Estonia during 
2016–2020. During 2006–2010, objectives referred to energy security 
and the Government Report on Security and Defence. Measures 
mentioned diplomatic relations via climate policy. During 2011–2015, 
the documents showed moderate integration in objectives, with Defence 
Forces’ needs to be considered in offshore wind development. Measures 
merely addressed energy security. A priority of security over low-carbon 
energy was detected with a statement as to the extent of energy system 
Fig. 3. Changing quality and extent of energy policy integration in security policy documents.  
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Table 5 
Summary of security policy integration in energy and climate policy documents.   
Estonia Finland Scotland 
2006–2010 Evidence in objectives 
Moderate integration in terms of energy efficiency 
and security of gas supply, oil shale production to be 
continued in interest of energy security, a reference to 
security policy strategy, energy market planning to 
take “all aspects of security” into account, and 
operational security and immunity of the power 
system 
Evidence of SPI in objectives 
Moderate integration in terms of increasing energy 
security via climate policy and a reference to 
Government Report on Security and Defence Policy 
and its attention to climate change 
Evidence of SPI in objectives 
Moderate integration in terms of energy security 
pertaining to international cooperation and diversity 
of and domestic renewables supply, securing the 
transmission system, stability in source/transit 
regions, and Scotland-specifically nuclear safety (via 
no use)  
Evidence of SPI in measures 
Moderate-to-high integration in terms of energy 
security (market cooperation, regulating oil shale, 
diversification of supply); including Ministry of 
Defence to knowledge/ legislation creation for 
nuclear power programme, cooperation with MoD in 
offshore wind planning, national defence and security 
with energy in Estonian R&D and Innovation Strategy 
Evidence of SPI in measures 
Low integration via mentions of security of supply 
via national emergency supply operations, e.g. 
stockpiling of fuels; including climate diplomacy in 
foreign relations  
Evidence of SPI in measures 
Moderate integration in terms of energy security 
(energy efficiency/saving, reforming international/ 
local markets, international cooperation, 
diversification, R&D), regulating offshore 
transmission system security, and Scotland- 
specifically legislation to oppose nuclear power 
Procedures & learning processes for SPI 
No observations  
Procedures & learning processes for SPI 
No observations 
Procedures & learning processes for SPI 
No observations 
Principled priority of SPI 
No observations 
Principled priority of SPI 
No observations 
Principled priority of SPI 
Moderate integration in Scotland: opposition of 
nuclear power for reasons of nuclear safety 
(radiation, risk of terrorist attacks) 
2011–2015 Evidence of SPI in objectives 
Low integration in terms of oil shale development to 
ensure security of supply but mitigating impacts on 
the environment and capacity development for 
gradual decarbonisation of the energy sector 
Evidence of SPI in objectives 
Moderate integration in terms of ensuring security of 
supply under all circumstances, energy efficiency, 
diversifying energy sources, securing oil transports; 
mentioning the needs of the Finnish Defence Forces 
when planning offshore wind 
Evidence of SPI in objectives 
Low-to-moderate integration in terms of energy 
security (low-carbon economy based on renewables, 
energy efficiency, diversification, systems resilience, 
security of gas/oil supply, investments in new 
generation capacity)  
Evidence of SPI in measures 
No observations 
Evidence of SPI in measures 
Low integration in terms of security of supply via 
national emergency supply agency, energy 
efficiency and legislation to ensure network 
operation even in exceptional circumstances 
Evidence of SPI in measures 
Low-to-moderate integration in terms of energy 
security (low-carbon economy/transition, electricity 
system reform, planning of Electricity Market, 
reports and regulations), statutory security of supply 
report and electricity capacity assessment 
Procedures & learning processes for SPI 
No observations 
Procedures & learning processes for SPI 
No observations 
Procedures & learning processes for SPI 
No observations 
Principled priority of SPI 
No observations 
Principled priority of SPI 
High integration: “Because of security of supply, 
energy system cannot be reformed to such an extent 
that supply of energy is compromised when shifting 
toward a low-carbon energy system” [100] 
Principled priority of SPI 
No observations 
2016–2020 Evidence of SPI in objectives 
High integration in terms of energy security (oil shale 
extraction, energy independency, EU/domestic 
primary energy sources, capacity development); re- 
defining security of supply for operational continuity 
even when transmission capacity between Member 
States is lost; specifying the use of the National 
Security Concept and restrictions from national 
defence considerations when planning energy 
generation; considering the impact of the geopolitical 
situation; reference to Cyber Security Strategy, 
National Security Concept and National Defence 
Development Plan 
Evidence of SPI in objectives 
Moderate integration in terms of security of supply 
in international electricity and gas networks and 
cyber security  
Evidence of SPI in objectives 
Moderate integration in terms of energy security, 
smarter, flexible network, reducing fossil fuel 
consumption, decarbonising while securing security 
of supply; resilience of the energy system and cyber 
security as a new specialism in the Scottish vision 
Evidence of SPI in measures 
High integration via Baltic energy market 
interconnection and energy synchronisation project, 
implementation of EU cybersecurity readiness 
measures, investments in additional pre-warning 
systems for defence and relaxing national altitude 
constraints via compensatory measures for defence to 
enable offshore-wind development; Cyber Security 
Council. 
Evidence of SPI in measures 
Moderate integration in terms of energy efficiency 
and security of energy supply, climate change 
adaptation plan including critical infrastructure and 
energy security, a mention of Ministry of Defence 
Energy and Climate strategy, national emergency 
supply agency’s cyber security operation, Nordic 
electricity market cooperation 
Evidence of SPI in measures 
Moderate integration in terms of international 
energy cooperation, market and legislation 
improvement; Scotland-specifically Cyber Resilience 
Strategy, cooperation of grid operators and 
generators, and efficient transmission networks  
Procedures & learning processes for SPI 
High integration in terms of Ministers of Defence and 
of Foreign affairs members in Government Climate 
and Energy Committee; “readiness of war” as an 
important principle for the development of energy 
systems and implementing the energy strategy; 
ministry of Defence taking over energy security 
during emergency 
Procedures & learning processes for SPI 
No observations 
Procedures & learning processes for SPI 
Moderate integration: Scottish expertise and skills in 
subsea engineering also used in defence sector 
Principled priority of SPI 
No observations 
Principled priority of SPI 
No observations 
Principled priority of SPI 
No observations  
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reform being conditioned by security of supply. During 2016–2020, 
cyber security added a new dimension to objectives and measures. Mea-
sures also included the Ministry of Defence’s Energy and Climate 
Strategy. 
Security policy integration in energy policy concerning Scotland 
stayed similar throughout: Many objectives and measures existed but 
mostly on energy and not on broader security. During 2006–2010, se-
curity objectives included a mention of the economic and political sta-
bility of energy source and transit countries. The UK energy policy 
diverged from the Scottish one by Scotland’s strong opposition of nu-
clear power demonstrated in objectives and measures; Scotland provides 
legislation for the no-nuclear scenario. It is a principled priority where 
the risk of radiation or terrorist attacks is seen larger than energy gains. 
During 2010–2016, objectives and measures showed less evidence of se-
curity policy integration. During 2016–2020, cyber security in the 
Scottish vision was stated as an objective. Using Scottish know-how in 
subsea engineering in the defence sector was a moderate form of inte-
gration via processes. The documents expressed a strong international 
market-orientated approach to energy security with ‘low-carbon global 
economy’ as an objective. 
Fig. 4 is our interpretation of how the documents show evidence of 
security policy integration using the four analytical categories ranging 
from low (dotted line) to high (thickest line) integration. In Estonia and 
Scotland, the integration first decreased and then increased in 
2016–2020. Our analysis shows that, in Estonia, national security is 
more deeply integrated into energy policy than in Finland and Scotland, 
including security and defence policy in energy policy planning exten-
sively. This can be explained by Estonia’s history with Russia, with only 
30 years of full independence and precaution in critical infrastructure 
development. The Finnish policy documents’ approach’ is quite 
different despite the long border and history with Russia. Scottish doc-
uments show a degree of independence from the UK, visible especially in 
the later periods around the independence referendum in 2014; some 
documents showcase the capacity and policy of an independent 
Scotland. 
5.4. Policy coherence 
Policy coherence was little addressed in any country and period. One 
document noted the policy coherence problem, while otherwise coher-
ence between low-carbon energy and national security was not 
acknowledged. Small examples of synergies, conflicts or measures were 
found (Table 6). 
Estonian documents did not mention pursuits to coherence between 
low-carbon energy and national security policy, assess the consistency of 
objectives and measures, nor were they explicit about the prioritisation 
between energy and security objectives. Yet, the documents stated that 
national interest is best served with oil shale, supporting the incumbent 
hydrocarbon-based system. The National Security Concept includes 
energy security and highlights the ‘rational use of oil shale’. Coherence 
may be somewhat advanced during 2016–2020 by including the 
Defence Ministry into the Climate and Energy Committee. Increasing 
energy efficiency and deployment of renewable energy in security policy 
shows a synergy between low-carbon energy and security policy. A 
potential conflict is created with solar energy creating new risks in terms 
of cyber security. The defence forces saw a conflict between national 
defence and wind power, due to disturbed pre-warning systems. Con-
flicts also exists between low-carbon energy pursuits and using oil shale 
to improve national security. 
During 2006–2020 in Finland, no objectives or measures addressed 
coherence between security and low-carbon energy. One document 
recognised the policy coherence problem: how different policies can 
remain unconnected or work against each other. Climate policy main-
streaming was seen as a tool to overcome this challenge from the 
decarbonisation perspective. During 2011–2015, the concept of 
comprehensive security considered energy issues, but gave priority to 
security. The Energy and Climate Strategy referred to coherence in terms 
a coherent future vision for energy security and emissions control. A 
conflict existed in wind power locations and operations by the Defence 
Forces. During 2016–2020, evidence of policy coherence somewhat 
increased but was insufficient. The Government Report on Foreign and 
Security Policy [92] stated: “In order to realise the strategic goals in an 
environment in flux, coordination in other policy sectors associated with 
foreign and security policy such as internal security and energy policy, is also 
needed.“ The Energy and Climate Strategy again mentioned the need for 
a coherent vision. It included measures such as adaptation programmes 
in different policy sub-systems, mentioning the Defence Ministry’s 
climate strategy. 
In Scotland during 2006–2010, no objectives or measures addressed 
coherence. One document referred to international energy security, 
connecting to geopolitics but not decarbonisation. An integrated strat-
egy for security and energy supply to reduce vulnerability to security 
shocks was mentioned. Measures to protect oil platforms in Iraq for 
Iran’s long-term stability constituted a conflict with decarbonisation. 
During 2011–2015, policy coherence was somewhat addressed by 
establishing the National Security Council including the Minister for 
Energy, and integrating the work of the foreign, defence, home, energy 
and international development departments. It promoted coherence 
from the perspective of national security. Some energy policy measures 
were outlined, such as increasing investment in renewable energy to 
improve national security. The declining domestic hydrocarbon pro-
duction was framed as a security risk, conflicting with low-carbon en-
ergy policy. Attempts to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf and to 
protect oil production were also in conflict with decarbonisation. During 
2015–2020, one issue linked to policy coherence: how the Cabinet Office 
deals with cross-sector mitigation and response related to energy and 
security. Cyber security was considered to improve the security of new 
smart systems, bringing security and decarbonisation closer. 
5.5. Landscape and niche factors in energy and security policy documents 
This section summarises our findings regarding how landscape 
pressures and energy niches were presented in the energy-security nexus 
of the documents. We do not address the regime-level here, considering 
that was covered via policy integration and coherence analysis in Sec-
tions 5.2-5.4. 
5.5.1. Landscape pressures 
A variety of economic, geopolitical and environmental landscape 
pressures were depicted in the documents of all countries, forming a 
setting for the policy objectives and measures proposed. Some docu-
ments go into the detail about the dynamics by which these pressures 
may evolve in the future. Contrarily, the security implications of new 
energy niches were addressed very little in security policy documents, 
and energy policy documents mostly addressed renewable energy niches 
as an element increasing security of supply. 
In Estonia, during 2006–2010, Russia was portrayed as a major 
landscape pressure, a global power prepared to use military force and 
using energy as political and economic means in international relations. 
Other landscape pressures included, for example, the globally increasing 
competition over energy coupled with risks of cyber-attacks, climate 
change and conflicts over distribution of land (see Appendix B). During 
2011–2015, fewer landscape factors were outlined due to shortage of 
material. During 2016–2020, many landscape pressures resembled the 
first period. However, Russia was addressed less, and new issues 
included the instability of the global economy, international finance and 
energy economy developments, and the possibility of military attacks on 
energy infrastructure. 
In Finland, during 2006–2010, many same landscape pressures 
existed as in Estonia, including international competition for energy, 
climate change and marine disasters. Russia was described as the EU’s 
most important trading partner, with interdependence in energy trade a 
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security risk as it uses energy as political leverage. Also, different issues 
were outlined: nuclear safety, Arctic energy resources and their security 
implications, China’s high demand for energy and organised military 
operations on energy infrastructure. During 2011–2015, the documents 
were more elaborate about Russian issues, Arctic developments and 
climate change as sources of potential security conflicts. Cross-border 
threats, such as disruptions in energy supply, were seen to expand. 
During 2016–2020, Russia was viewed to aim for a superpower status, 
willing to employ military force and challenging the EU security system. 
Akin to Estonia, the documents mentioned economic and political 
instability due to decreased demand for fossil fuels. 
Documents concerning Scotland, during 2006–2010, highlighted 
similar issues as above. Global state-led competition for energy was seen 
to involve security implications via producing states using energy as a 
‘hostile policy tool’, and the exploitation of resources becoming a source 
of regional instability. Globally, inequality, social unrest and corruption 
were seen to increase supply disruptions. The Russia-EU gas dispute was 
mentioned, where Russia is using energy as a political lever causing 
supply disruptions. Nuclear safety was an issue for Scotland. Issues not 
acknowledged in other countries included crime in marine areas, and a 
breakdown of the rules-based international system. During 2010–2015, 
developments in the Arctic region, emerging markets and nuclear pro-
liferation came up. The landscape pressures facing maritime energy 
supply included thefts of supplies and the crowding of sea space with 
transport and offshore energy installations. The period 2015–2020 
mentioned fewer landscape pressures: cyber-attacks, climate change, 
global pandemics and nuclear and chemical weapons were mentioned. 
5.5.2. Security considerations of energy niches 
When energy niches gradually become part of socio-technical energy 
regimes, they change system security considerations. Yet, these con-
siderations were little addressed compared to the number issues iden-
tified in our literature review (Section 2.1). The documents did not 
mention security of supply for new energy technologies, critical min-
erals and metals, nor the opportunities/risks for consensus building and 
conflicts from expanding renewable energy. 
During 2006–2015, Estonian documents did not note energy niches. 
They merely implied that local wood fuels might improve energy secu-
rity. During 2016–2020, security became more visible in the energy 
policy documents with statements that local offshore wind, hydro and 
biomass can increase energy security. A connection was made to defence 
policy restrictions set for wind-energy development that may be 
exempted with a scheme of additional pre-warning radars. Security 
documents note that increasing ability to harness solar energy will be 
accompanied by threats and risks, requiring work to ensure smart and 
preventive defence against them. 
Similarly, in Finland, energy niches were rarely addressed in security 
policy documents. During 2010–2015, wind power was identified as an 
area of Arctic energy expertise for Finnish-Russian cooperation. A small 
note was made in energy policy documents that in planning offshore 
wind farms, needs of the defence forces must be considered. During 
2011–2020, renewable energy was seen to increase security of supply. 
Security policy documents concerning Scotland did not address en-
ergy niches. Energy policy documents mentioned some developments. 
During 2006–2010, renewable energy was seen by Scotland as “far more 
Fig. 4. Changing quality and extent of security and defence policy integration in energy and climate policy documents.  
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robust” for energy security than a fossil fuel -based system, while also 
carbon capture and storage was remarked to allow fossil fuels to 
contribute to energy security. These views were also stated in during 
2011–2015, with an added remark that electric vehicles have implica-
tions on energy security posing increased demands on the grid but also 
giving opportunities to balance electricity demand variation. 
2016–2020 saw different passing references to security from niches, 
including cyber security associated with new energy technologies. 
Table 7 illustrates how security of supply is the most frequently 
mentioned security consideration of accelerating energy niches. It also 
shows that Finland has not addressed security risks arising from energy 
niches, while in Estonia and Scotland it is a recent development. Defence 
and radar systems are an issue for Finland and Estonia, but less visible in 
the Finnish documents. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
Policy coherence is pursued as part of UN sustainable development 
goals to reduce conflicts and promote synergies between different policy 
areas. A connected concept, policy integration, has a long history in the 
EU, particularly in promoting cross-sectoral environmental protection. 
Here, we combined the analysis of policy coherence and integration with 
sustainability transitions’ research, examining policy interplay between 
energy and security policy and how landscape pressures and energy 
niches are presented at this interface in policy strategy documents. We 
analysed in total 72 documents concerning three European nations. Of 
the case nations, Scotland is not independent, with security and energy 
policy administered by the UK government. Yet, its independence efforts 
brought an interesting angle to the analysis, as Scottish policy docu-
ments were used as means to display Scotland’s somewhat differing 
political aims. 
Security and energy policy strategies present a degree of functional 
overlap [cf. 99], because both cover energy security. Energy security has 
been a core goal of energy policy from the early 1970s, while climate 
change has become an additional goal since the 1990s, increasing in 
importance. To security and foreign policy, energy has been a new area 
since the early 2000s. Our analysis shows that the integration of energy 
into security policy has been highest in Scotland during 2006–2010 and 
in Finland during 2011–2015, while in Estonia, low. The integration of 
hydrocarbon-based energy policy and low-carbon energy policy co- 
exist, the latter becoming stronger during 2011–2015 (e.g. objectives 
and processes for making defence forces infrastructure more energy 
efficient) but showing some disintegration during 2016–2020. Overall, 
energy policy is less integrated into security policy documents than vice 
versa. In energy policy documents, energy security is very visible, while 
broader security concerns (e.g. national defence or cyber security) are 
moderately addressed. We observe some disintegration during 
2011–2015, while integration strengthens during 2016–2020 with new 
mentions of cyber security and the need to consider national defence 
issues in energy system planning; integration being the highest in 
Estonia. Overall, insufficient policy integration is demonstrated by 
conflicting statements pertaining to fossil fuels, renewable energy, en-
ergy security and carbon emissions, and the absence of discussion in the 
documents on potentially conflicting objectives [cf. 73]. We can observe 
a principled priority given to national security, evident in the concepts 
and committees supporting this. No explicit measures for resources or 
evaluation mechanisms to improve policy integration are outlined. 
Policy coherence is also inadequately addressed in all countries’ 
policy documents. Some processes or measures exist, but they do not 
take a harmonious approach to coherence [cf. [60]]. Rather, they pri-
oritise national security (e.g. Comprehensive Concept of National Se-
curity or National Security Council). Mechanisms for a balanced 
Table 6 
Summary of policy coherence.   
Estonia Finland Scotland 









ergy transition  
- Policy coherence not 
addressed in energy- 
security context  
- Coherence problem 
recognised in 
general; climate 









but not linked to 
low-carbon  
- Conflict between 
climate change 
mitigation and 
UK’s action to 
protect oil 
platform in Iraq 
for geopolitical 
stability 














- Energy and Climate 
Strategy mentions a 
coherent vision for 
energy security and 
emissions control  
- Conflict regarding 
wind power and 
defence operations  
- National Security 
Council including 
energy and 
defence and the 
Energy Minister  












- Synergy via 









tems of wind 
power, and 
plans for oil 
shale and peat  
- Foreign and Security 
Policy Report states 
that coordination 
with energy policy is 
needed  
- Energy and Climate 
Strategy mentions a 
coherent vision for 




- No explicit measures 
proposed for policy 
coherence  
- Policy coherence 
not explicit in the 
security 
documents  
- Cabinet Office 
deals with cross- 
sector mitigation 
and response 
related to energy 
and security  
- Energy documents 
refer often to 
international 
security to secure 
energy security  
Table 7 
Illustration of the focus given to security considerations of energy niches.   
2006–2010 2011–2015 2016–2020 
Renewable energy increasing security of supply 
Estonia + ++
Finland  ++ ++
Scotland +++ ++ +
New security risks arising from renewable energy/electric vehicles 
Estonia   ++
Finland    
Scotland  ++ ++
Conflicts (and solutions) between defence radar systems and wind power 
Estonia   +++
Finland  +
Scotland     
P. Kivimaa and M.H. Sivonen                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Energy Research & Social Science 75 (2021) 102024
13
consideration of low-carbon energy transitions and national security are 
missing. Attempts towards policy coherence may still be present in 
practical policy making but the documents reveal it is not something 
that is important to publicly disclose, indicating a lack of coherence at 
least on the level of public objective-setting and reporting on policy. 
While this means that energy policy is not highly securitised, it also 
shows that traditional energy security thinking dominates, and a 
reframing of security based on energy transitions is lacking. 
The document analysis showed an increasingly complex and multi-
faceted landscape, where many pressures have intensified and expanded 
over time (see Fig. 5 illustrating the findings). They have created a 
complicated policy environment, where it may be increasingly difficult 
to pursue coherence between energy and security policy. The past 
hydrocarbon-based energy policy was perhaps easier to integrate with 
national security than the new low-carbon energy policy combined with 
cascading pressures from climate change, domestic and international 
conflicts, and increasing global instability and demand for energy. Yet, 
this changing landscape calls for more careful assessments of the op-
portunities for and means of increasing coherence to advance an envi-
ronmentally and socially sustainable and secure energy transition. 
In turn, despite the accelerating energy transition, the security im-
plications of energy niches were little and rather superficially 
mentioned. Renewable energy was seen to increase security of supply 
and security risks were generally noted. Offshore wind had impacts on 
defence forces’ pre-warning systems. However, security issues noted in 
literature, such as critical materials for renewable energy and supply 
routes [35,36] and potential impacts on peace and conflict [17] were 
absent. A partial explanation may be that the energy transition has 
progressed more rapidly than initially thought and, therefore, issues 
identified in academic literature have yet not become policy consider-
ations. There may also be political sensitivity to identify issues such as 
reactions of the far-right on renewable energy [39] as national security 
concerns. Recent developments in just transitions policy, for example in 
the European Commission, point that social issues and the alleviation of 
potential conflicts is receiving rapidly increasing attention from poli-
cymakers, which would not have shown yet in our analysis. 
The risk of energy-rich countries using energy as a geopolitical 
weapon and the increasing risk of conflicts from globally rising energy 
demand are well recognised, creating likely struggles with advancing 
the low-carbon energy transition globally, but may also support the 
progress of decentralised renewable energy systems. Thus, we argue that 
it is vital for policymakers to pay more explicit attention in their official 
strategies to the security implications of new low-carbon technologies 
and smart energy systems. In addition to questions of ‘minerals security’ 
[19], the risk of increasing ‘securitisation’ of natural resources can lead 
to diminishing domestic or regional security and patterns of violence 
and conflict [101,102]. The security implications of climate change 
more broadly, such as environmental disasters and global stability, were 
noted in documents concerning Finland and Scotland but not Estonia. 
While ‘climate security’ [38] has entered the security debate, it needs to 
become a more explicit part of national and international energy and 
climate policymaking. 
We conclude that the established framing of national security, pri-
oritising hydrocarbons, demonstrated in official policy documents, may 
Fig. 5. Illustration of policy coherence, integration, landscape pressures and energy niches at the interface of energy and security policies (a dotted line indicates 
insufficient attention). 
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delay the much-needed energy transition due to policy incoherence and 
conflicting signals to stakeholders. Thus, we argue that achieving 
improved policy coherence and integration between energy and secu-
rity, new ways of thinking about energy in national security policy, and 
about security in energy policy are urgently needed. Yet, increasing 
renewable energy is not a simplistic synergy with security of supply due 
the technologies’ dependencies on critical materials and supply routes. 
Moreover, the security risks are not similar across different energy 
niches and in different countries and, thus, require more specific anal-
ysis. The energy and security policy nexus should also consider the 
changing security implications of the low-carbon energy transition 
globally, such as effects on changing international relations, regional 
conflicts and their resolutions, trade of technology and critical materials, 
and the vulnerability of energy systems to disruptive weather events and 
other abrupt landscape changes, such as pandemics. Further research is 
needed to deepen the understanding of this policy interplay at the 
changing security and energy context, for instance, by analysing 
contemporary stakeholder perceptions of future developments during 
the transition, or by developing specific processes for policy integration 
and coherence. 
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Appendix A. Policy documents selected for the analysis    




Long-term Climate and Energy Strategy 
(2008) 
Government Foresight Report on Climate and 
Energy (2009) 
National Energy and Climate Strategy (2013) 
Background Report for the National Energy 
and Climate Strategy (2013) 
Energy and Climate Roadmap (2014) 
National Energy and Climate Strategy (2017) 
Background Report for the National Energy and 
Climate Strategy (2017) 





Strategy for Safeguarding Vital Societal 
Functions (2006) 
Government Report on Finland’s Defence and 
Security Policy (2009) 
Security Strategy for Society (2010) 
Government Report on Finland’s Security and 
Defence Policy (2012) 
Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy (2013) 
Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 
(2013) 
Ministry of Defence Strategy on Society and 
Environment (2011) 
Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security 
Policy (2016) 
Update to Finland’s Arctic Strategy (2016) 
Society’s Security Strategy (2017) 
Government Report on Defence (2017) 
Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy (2019) 





Development Plan of the Energy Sector until 
2020 (2009) 
National Development Plan for the 
Utilization of Oil Shale 2008–2015 (2008) 
Development Plan of the Estonian Electricity 
Sector until 2018 (2009) 
National Renewable Energy Action Plan 2020 
(2009) 
National Development Plan for the Use of Oil 
Shale 2016–2030 (2015) 
National Development Plan for the Energy Sector 
until 2030 (2017) 
General Principles of Climate Policy until 2050 
(2017) 
Estonian National Energy and Climate Plan 2030 




Cyber Security Strategy (2008) 
National Security Concept of Estonia (2010) 
Estonian Long-Term Defence Development 
Plan 2009 – 2018 (2009) 
National Defence Strategy (2011) 
Estonian National Cyber Security Strategy 
(2014) 
National Defence Development Plan 
2013 – 2022 (2013) 
National Defence Development Plan 2017–2026 
(2017) 
National Security Concept of Estonia (2017) 
Digital Agenda 2020 for Estonia (2018) 
Cyber Security Strategy (2019) 
Scotland  Energy/ 
Climate 
17 documents 
The Energy Challenge (2006) 
The Scottish Government Response (2007) 
UK White Paper on Energy (2007) 
Scottish Government overview on Energy 
(2008) 
UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (2009) 
Scotland’s Offshore Wind Route Map (2010) 
The Carbon Plan: Delivering Our Low Carbon 
Future (2011) 
Security of Energy Supply Scotland (2014) 
UK Energy Efficiency Action Plan (2014) 
Decarbonising heat: A policy statement of the 
Scottish government (2015) 
Scottish Government Energy Security Report 
(2015) 
Scottish Energy Strategy (2017) 
Energy Efficiency Scotland Route Map (2018) 
Renewables obligation: Scotland’s Response (2018) 
Energy Consumer Action Plan (2019) 
Scotland’s electricity and gas networks (2019) 





National Security Strategy (2008) 
National Security Strategy (update, 2009) 
National Security Strategy (2010) 
The Strategy for Defence (2011) 
The Digital Strategy of the Ministry of 
Defence (2012) 
Scotland analysis: Security (2013) 
Scotland Analysis: Defence (2013) 
The UK National Strategy for Maritime 
Security (2014) 
National Security Strategy and Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (2015) 
Cyber resilience strategy for Scotland (2015) 
National Cyber Security Strategy (2016) 
Industry for Defence and a Prosperous Britain: 
Refreshing Defence Industrial Policy (2017) 
National Security Capability Review (2018) 
Cyber Resilience Strategy for Scotland: Economic 
Actions (2018) 
Cyber Resilience Strategy for Scotland: Learning 
and Skills Plan (2018) 
Cyber Resilience Strategy for Scotland: Third Sector 
Action Plan (2018)   
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Appendix B. Identified landscape pressures and niche security consideration at the energy-security nexus of the policy documents   
2006–2010 2011–2015 2016–2020 
Estonia Landscape pressures:   
- Russia as a major global power prepared to use 
military force, using energy as political/economic 
means in international relations  
- Energy import dependency on Russia  
- Cyber-attacks with physical damage  
- Conflicts over distribution of land  
- Climate change  
- Natural disasters  
- Infectious diseases  
- Nuclear accidents  
- Increased ship-traffic, marine disasters  
- Global energy market developments  
- Rapid development of RES 
Landscape pressures:   
- Attacks against energy and ICT systems  
- Uncertainties in global energy markets  
- Environmental pressures 
Landscape pressures:   
- Changes in energy supply structure between Russia 
and EU  
- Risk of cyber-attacks  
- Globally increasing demand for energy, leading to 
global instability  
- Climate change and following tensions and conflicts  
- Nuclear accidents  
- Instability of global economy  
- International finance and energy economy 
developments  
- Possibility of military attacks on energy infra 
Niches:   
- No attention to energy niches in security documents  
- More extensive use of local fuel (wood) to improve 
energy security 
Niches:   
- No attention to energy niches in security 
documents  
- No attention to security implications of niches in 
energy documents 
Niches:   
- Security documents note that increasing ability to 
harness solar energy will be accompanied by threats 
and risks, requiring work to ensure smart and 
preventive defence against them.  
- Intention to increase energy security through 
establishment of local off-shore wind, hydro and 
biomass generation  
- The completion of more than 4GW of planned wind 
farms depends on the mitigation of defence 
restrictions  
- Supporting wind energy development by additional 
pre-warning radars to achieve exemptions to altitude 
restrictions set by defence policy 
Finland Landscape:   
- Russia as EU’s most important trading partner, with 
interdependence in energy trade a security risk as it 
uses energy as political leverage  
- Risks from Russia’s obsolescent nuclear plants  
- Organised military operations on energy infra  
- Arctic energy resources and their security 
implications  
- Nuclear safety  
- Increasing international competition for energy  
- Climate change  
- China’s high demand for energy and raw materials  
- Increased ship-traffic, marine disasters  
- Terrorism 
Landscape:   
- Russia as largest trading partner to EU and 
Finland; with an aim to preserve its great power 
status built on abundant energy reserve, but 
facing internal challenges  
- Increasing demand for energy globally  
- Risk of nuclear accidents  
- Conflicting developments in the Arctic: climate 
change opening transport route and increasing 
exploitation of energy  
- Climate change effects on critical infrastructure 
and conflicts over resources  
- Cyber attacks  
- Terrorism  
- Infectious diseases  
- China as major importer of raw materials and 
energy 
Landscape:   
- Russia described as aiming for superpower status, 
with will to employ military force, challenging EU 
security system  
- Broad energy cooperation between EU and Russia  
- Nuclear accidents  
- Pandemics  
- Cyber threats  
- Development of the Arctic region  
- Climate change – global commitments but limits of 
international institutions  
- Economic and political instability due to decreased 
demand of fossil fuels 
Niches:   
- Note on the increasing role of renewable energy in 
global energy policy but security not discussed 
beyond power plants fulfilling regular safety and 
security requirements 
Niches:   
- Increasing renewable energy will increase 
security of supply  
- Wind power as an area of Arctic energy expertise 
but security not discussed  
- In planning offshore wind farms, needs of the 
Defence Forces need to be considered 
Niches:   
- No attention on energy niches in security documents  
- Increasing renewable energy will increase security of 
supply, especially when using demand flexibility and 
power-to-x 
Scotland Landscape:  
- Russia-UK gas dispute, using energy as a political 
lever; stable EU-Russia energy relations, but risk of 
supply disruptions; Russia raising energy as a foreign 
policy priority  
- Nuclear safety (only for Scotland)  
- Stability of energy source and transit countries  
- Climate change  
- Increasing global demand for energy influenced by 
population growth and urbanisation  
- Breakdown of the rules-based international system  
- China as growing world power  
- Economic crisis  
- Crime in Marine areas/piracy  
- Cyber security  
- Disruptions to oil and gas supplies 
Landscape pressures:   
- Russia’s actions on Europe’s Eastern 
neighbourhood and the EU’s energy dependence 
on Russia  
- Increasing global demand for energy globally, 
with volatile prices  
- regional disputes, instability, terrorism  
- Technological development  
- Globalisation, resource competition, population 
growth  
- Climate change  
- Increasing global use of seas and crime in marine 
areas (e.g. piracy)  
- Developments in the Arctic region Nuclear 
proliferation  
- Emerging markets  
- Disruption to oil and gas supplies 
Landscape pressures:   
- Cyber attacks  
- Climate change  
- Global pandemics and antimicrobial resistance  
- Nuclear & chemical weapons  
- (Rather little attention to landscape pressures in 
connection to energy in security policy documents) 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued )  
2006–2010 2011–2015 2016–2020 
Niches:   
- No attention on energy niches in security documents  
- Renewable energy “far more robust” for energy 
security  
- Also, carbon capture and storage (CCS) seen to 
improve energy security 
Niches:   
- No attention on energy niches in security 
documents  
- Electric vehicles have implications on energy 
security, e.g. increased demand on the grid and 
opportunities to balance variations in electricity 
demand.  
- Scotland’s contribution to UK’s renewable 
generation provide greater energy diversity to 
meet the challenges of energy security  
- CCS will allow fossil fuels to contribute security of 
supply 
Niches:   
- No attention on energy niches in security documents  
- New technologies (e.g. electric vehicles, heat pumps, 
and new generation) are part of the Scottish vision 
which includes cyber security as a new specialism  
- Offshore wind generation and grid infrastructure 
projects may have cross-border effects on security of 
supply in the North Sea area  
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[89] E. Ylitalo, Puupellettien tuotanto väheni ja tuonti lisääntyi vuonna 2019, Suom. 
Luonnonvarak. LUKE, Uut. (2020). https://www.luke.fi/uutinen/puupellettien- 
tuotanto-vaheni-ja-tuonti-lisaantyi-vuonna-2019/ (accessed December 9, 2020). 
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